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How does God do things? What can God know? Do we have experience 
of God? These are the three questions that motivate Evan Fales’s 
sometimes frustrating, sometimes fascinating book, Divine Intervention: 
Metaphysical and Epistemological Puzzles.
Fales isn’t clear on whether or not he believes in God. Superficially, 
it sometimes sounds like he does, when for example he asks questions 
like: ‘How exactly does God make things happen in our world?’ (p. 3) 
But other times, it seems like he doesn’t, when for example he presents 
a problem regarding God’s omniscience, and says that ‘the theist’ does 
not have ‘an easy escape’ (p. 70).
There’s a sense in which Fales’s secrecy regarding his own beliefs is 
fine: atheists and theists can discuss the philosophical issues equally well; 
one doesn’t need to put one’s cards on the table before doing philosophy 
of religion. But the problem is that it’s sometimes hard to figure out 
where Fales is going with his discussion – he often raises worries, says 
that the discussion is inconclusive, and then moves on. Perhaps that’s 
all he’s trying to do, but one gets the sense that there’s more going on. 
Specifically (both from reading this book and reading Fales’s other work), 
I gather that he’s more on the atheist side of the atheist/theist spectrum, 
and he’s trying to raise worries for theistic belief. (This comes out most 
clearly toward the end of the book, as I’ll discuss below.)
While Fales doesn’t quite present his book this way, I see it as divided 
into three parts. The first part discusses metaphysical issues, involving 
how God could interact with the world. The second part involves 
epistemological issues, such as whether God could be omniscient, 
and whether God faces sceptical worries. The third part critiques the 
argument from religious experience for the existence of God. I’ll discuss 
each of these parts below. Some foreshadowing: the metaphysics part 
is sometimes frustratingly inconclusive and sometimes interesting, the 
religious experience part doesn’t have much new, and the epistemology 
part is exciting and thought-provoking.
First, metaphysics. Is it even possible for a  nonphysical being like 
God to interact with the physical world, and if so, how does God do it? 
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Fales discusses various views of the nature of causation, to try to figure 
this out, but concludes:
We know as yet too little about causation, as I judge, to come to reasonably 
definitive conclusions about the nature, or even the possibility, of divine 
interventions in the physical order. (p. 154)
He also takes up the question of whether God establishes what the laws 
of nature are, and the question of whether the laws, once established, 
could be suspended. His conclusion is similarly inconclusive:
We do not have firm enough a grasp upon laws, and perhaps also on 
space and time, to arrive at clear determinations of the possibilities here. 
(p. 154)
Fales’s positive contribution here is ‘to bring into relief the inadequacy 
of the fiat lux model of divine activity, which has too commonly been 
taken to settle the matter’ (p. 36). According to the fiat lux model, God 
creates just by commanding. But Fales rightly asks a question: ‘what is 
the connection between God so commanding, and its coming to pass?’ 
(p. 33) It appears that this connection is a causation relation, and needs 
a corresponding law of nature governing this causal relation. But where 
does that law of nature come from? It’s hard to see how this law of nature 
could come from God’s command, on pain of vicious regress.
The other issue in metaphysics Fales discusses is the relationship 
between God and time. Here the discussion is less inconclusive, but I’m 
not happy with Fales’s conclusion. He writes:
If there were a  universe lacking a  preferred reference frame [and our 
universe is such a  universe, according to the standard interpretation 
of Einstein’s theory of relativity], there would be no facts of the matter 
of how God relates temporally to that universe – when He acts in that 
universe, which of His actions are simultaneous, or what the temporal 
relationship is between His willing that a  certain event occur in that 
universe, and the time of its occurrence. (p. 56)
Well, in a universe with no preferred reference frame, the standard view 
is that the eternalist theory of time is true. According to eternalism, the 
universe is a four-dimensional space-time system, with no objective facts 
about which events are past, present, or future, and no objective flow of 
time. In such a universe, there are no objective facts about simultaneity 
for events that are located in different regions of the universe – but it is 
reasonable to hold that events that are co-located are simultaneous. My 
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view is that, in an eternalist universe, we need to take God’s omnipresence 
seriously  – when God acts in the universe, he is co-located with the 
physical region of spacetime that contains the effect of his act. Since God 
sustains the universe in existence, God is co-located everywhere, and 
God’s actions are simultaneous with the effects of God’s actions. Pace 
Fales, I don’t see a problem here.
Let’s turn to the third part of Fales’s book, saving the most exciting 
second part for last. In the third part, Fales critiques the argument from 
religious experience for the existence of God. Specifically, Fales argues 
that there are no adequate criteria distinguishing veridical mystical 
experiences from illusory ones. He also argues that the account of 
mystical experiences that maintains that they are somehow caused by 
God is a  less satisfactory account than that which holds that they can 
be accounted for naturalistically, via the resources of anthropology 
and neurophysiology. Fales concludes that mystical experiences do not 
provide anyone with good evidence for supernatural reality.
Fales is savvy enough to recognize that simply providing a naturalistic 
explanation for mystical experiences isn’t enough to disqualify mystical 
experiences as evidence of the supernatural  – it could be that the 
naturalistic explanation correctly says, for example, that the mystical 
experiencer is in a  certain brain state, while there is also a  correct 
supernatural explanation of why the experiencer is in that brain state. 
But Fales goes on to argue that, for the case of mystical experiences, the 
anthropological and neurophysiological explanations are better than just 
the supernatural one, and attempting to add a supernatural explanation 
to the anthropological and neurophysiological explanations diminishes 
the force of the naturalistic explanations.
Overall, I didn’t find that much philosophically new in Fales’s critique 
of the argument from religious experience. The most interesting parts were 
his appeals to anthropology and neurophysiology. On the anthropology 
side, Fales discusses the work of I. M. Lewis, who argues that certain 
social contexts are more likely to produce people who act as mystics, 
and claim to have mystical experiences. On the neurophysiological 
side, Fales points out that certain types of mystical experiences can be 
generated by electrical stimulation of parts of the brain. He puts forth 
the interesting hypothesis that people who are more prone to having 
religious experience have thinner myelin sheathing on their nerves in 
the temporal lobe, so that electrical signals can jump from one axon to 
neighbouring ones, thus releasing an avalanche of nerve firings that give 
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rise to the feeling of a  mystical experience. Fales maintains that such 
naturalistic accounts cannot be happily supplemented with an appeal to 
God as the cause of mystical experiences.
Let’s turn, finally, to the second and most exciting part of Fales’s 
book, his discussion of epistemological issues. Fales gives two arguments 
for the view that God is not omniscient. His first argument holds that 
God is ‘impassible’, and hence that God can’t know the contingent facts 
that could only be known by perceiving the world. Fales doesn’t define 
‘impassible’, and while it often means ‘incapable of suffering or feeling 
pain’, I take from context that Fales means something stronger. He writes:
God, it is generally supposed, is impassible. And that means that no 
created object is causally responsible for anything that happens to God: 
nothing ever happens to God. (p. 71)
Fales argues that, because God is impassible, God can’t perceive the 
world, and hence can’t know contingent facts about the world. This is, 
clearly, a  result that traditional theists would not be at all happy with. 
How would they respond?
One response Fales considers is for the theist to hold that God knows 
everything about the world because God knowingly wills it, and God 
knows that what God wills is fulfilled (p. 72). But Fales points out two 
interesting difficulties for this response. One difficulty is: how does God 
know that God’s will is successful? God can’t know it by way of empirical 
investigation, under the assumption that God is impassible (in Fales’s 
strong sense that God is not causally affected by the world). Perhaps God 
could know that there is a law-like connection between his will and the 
effects of his will via a priori means. But Fales says that ‘it is not easy to 
see ... how a law is the sort of thing that could be known a priori (even 
by God)’ (pp. 72-3).
The second difficulty Fales raises for the response that God knows 
everything about the world because God knowingly wills it is that 
(according to Fales) God does not will everything that happens 
in the world  – if something like the standard interpretation of 
quantum mechanics is true, then fundamental physical processes are 
indeterministic. Fales doesn’t go into this in detail, but I think this raises 
an  interesting concern about God’s control over what happens in the 
world. For example, according to quantum mechanics, there’s a non-zero 
chance that we could all die in the next second, if for example enough 
of our particles scatter to distant regions (which is allowed by quantum 
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mechanics, since the wave function tails for a particle extend to infinity). 
Presumably God is not simply leaving it up to chance that we continue 
to exist; this makes me think that God is at least willing to exert his will 
over even indeterministic events in the universe.
All this is in response to Fales’s argument that God is not omniscient 
because he’s impassible. I think that the most promising way to respond 
to Fales’s argument is simply to hold that God is impassible only in 
the sense that he doesn’t suffer, not in the sense that he’s not causally 
affected by the world. Fales recognizes this option, and his counterreply 
is simply to move on to his second argument for the claim that God is 
not omniscient.
Fales’s second argument for the claim that God is not omniscient 
applies the argument of an  epistemological sceptic to God himself. 
Specifically, Fales asks, how does God know that he is not being deceived 
by an evil demon? Fales’s discussion here is sophisticated and intriguing, 
and I won’t be able to do it justice. Fales’s overall point is that ‘God Himself 
has no reasoned response to the sceptical worry that His cognitive 
faculties might be in some way defective’ (p. 83). God can’t know that 
they aren’t defective through his own activity  – even if he decided to 
banish epistemological evil demons from the world, how could be he be 
certain that he had successfully done so? Fales says that, for God to be 
omniscient, ‘God must just set aside the conceptual possibility raised by 
the sceptic’ (p. 84). But in doing so, God isn’t being perfectly rational. 
Fales concludes that God can be either omniscient or perfectly rational, 
but not both.
At the end of his book, Fales correctly points out that he has avoided 
talking about the traditional, familiar puzzles associated with God’s 
omnipotence and omniscience. This is true, but as a result the philosophy 
in Fales’s book sometimes seems comparatively underdeveloped. But 
Fales is to commended for raising new issues, and trying to start new 
debates. Given the long history of philosophy of religion, this is hard to 
do, and Fales deserves credit for being successful in doing so.
